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http://www.energybulletin.net/45331.html
ANWR is not the answer
by Dave Cohen
Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert...
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
-- from The Second Coming, W. B. Yeats
Americans are easily misled about domestic "supply-side" solutions to
rising oil prices and dwindling global exports. Their confusion is
understandable. Oil company executives like Shell's John Hofmeister
have called for opening up now restricted areas in Alaska or on the
outer continental shelves, implying that salvation is only a few oil
wells away.
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) or the Mineral Management
Service (MMS) routinely assign huge reserves numbers to unexploited,
presumably prospective, areas, but it is not clear to people who do
not follow the oil industry that these agencies are talking about
undiscovered oil.
The age of easy, cheap oil in the United States is over and done with
(ASPO-USA, May 26, 2008). The Lower-48 peaked in 1970. The volatile
shallow-water oil production in the Gulf of Mexico last peaked in
1998, forcing operators to move out to deeper and deeper water. The
impressive development of Alaska's Prudhoe Bay in the 1970s will not
be repeated elsewhere in Alaska onshore or off. Prudhoe Bay peaked in
about 1989.
An Exemplary Story
Promoting supply-side solutions to America's oil crisis creates a
dangerous delusion. Before turning to the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR), I want to tell you an exemplary story because both time
and memories are short. This article runs long as a result, but it's a
good story.
I have marked up the NYMEX monthly oil price curve I used in The Age
of Aquarius, where I explained the market fundamentals driving the oil
price (ASPO-USA, May 14, 2008). Here is the new version.
The oil price took a downward turn in August, 2006. As you can see,
the price had been volatile but rising from mid-2004 on. The August
downturn could have been yet another price blip, but on September 5th,
Chevron announced the successful Jack-#2 test well in the Walker Ridge
area of the ultra-deepwater Gulf of Mexico. To a world starved for
good news on the oil front, the Jack discovery was treated like the
Second Coming.
The_yukon I was writing for The Oil Drum (TOD) back then, and I duly
penned (after consulting with oil industry insider "Bubba") Jack-2 and
the Lower Tertiary of the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico on September 11th.
I did not think Jack would have a significant impact on domestic
supply in 2006 and I have not changed my mind in 2008.
The media repeated the tentative claim of Chevron's geologists that
there could be anywhere between 3 and 15 billion recoverable barrels
in the Gulf lower tertiary play, emphasizing the high end of this
exceptionally broad range. An energy illiterate public thought that
sounded like a lot of oil. We could all continue to cruise to Wal-Mart
in our GMC Yukons to buy cheap stuff made in China, no problemo.
The hype surrounding the Jack flow test was like a tsunami washing
over peak oil people stranded on beaches all over the world. Business
Week said there was plenty of oil, just drill deeper. Cambridge Energy
Research Associates (CERA) played up the discovery, which was no
surprise, asking whether this might be the biggest oil play in 38
years. Little did I know that CERA had some other tricks up their
sleeve.
Daniel_yergin The dip in the oil price which had started in August
became a nosedive as the Autumn progressed and the Jack discovery
guided market sentiment on oil. CERA moved in for the kill, releasing
their report Why the "Peak Oil" Theory Falls Down -- Myths, Legends and
the Future of Oil Resources on November 10, 2006. This was just what
the world wanted to hear--these "peak oil" people are a bunch of
nutters, we're all whackos. Soon we would be swimming in new oil, Adam
Smith's free market having worked its magic once again. Daniel Yergin
had a field day in the fall of 2006. CERA report sales were no doubt
brisk.
Picking myself off the floor, and after consulting with Professor
Goose and other Oil Drum editors, I sat down in a single marathon
writing session to produce Does the Peak Oil "Myth" Just Fall Down? --
Our Response to CERA, which was published at TOD on November 16, 2006.
But the damage had been done. Take another look at the annotated price
graph above.
The downward price momentum spurred on by the Jack discovery and the
CERA report finally bottomed out in January, 2007 when the average
monthly NYMEX price fell to $54.57/barrel. I have added a rough curve
fit (dotted line) to the graph which shows that if the price had
continued to rise on the trend since mid-2004, the oil price would be
just about where it is today, about $124/barrel. The market fooled
itself into thinking happy days were here again. Precious time
required to address the oil crisis was wasted. Oil became, for a time,
underpriced. Now, you can't even trade in the Yukon (Wall Street
Journal, June 2, 2008).
And what of Jack? Chevron plans to drill another appraisal well
sometime later this year. Commercial oil production is on hold pending
the results and a development plan must be put together because the
Walker Ridge is way out there in the Gulf many miles from nowhere--just
like ANWR. And if BP's delayed Thunder Horse is any guide, don't get
your hopes up for any oil from Jack (together with St. Malo) before
2014.
And what of CERA? Now they say oil has as reached a turning point--
What is now unfolding is an oil shock. The fact that the world
could take $80 in its stride in the context of strong economic growth
does not mean that a price that is 60 per cent higher at a time of a
credit crunch will be so easily assimilated. The economic toll is
mounting. Airlines are certainly in shock as they start charging for
checked luggage to find a way to pass on their biggest cost. Carmakers
are reeling. Retailers are tracking the shrinking wallets of their
customers. The rising prices for food reflect, in part, the impact of
higher energy costs.
My goodness, it's an oil shock! ????????? ? ??????--Jesus Wept (John's
Gospel, 11:35).
The Jack story serves as a cautionary tale for those who believe
supply-side solutions to America's oil supply problem are a magic
bullet that will end our energy suffering. Let's turn now to ANWR to
see what the future might hold for supply-side solutions there should
the area be opened up for development.
ANWR Is Not The Answer
Anwr_north_slope Realistic expectations about ANWR needn't come as any
surprise to the media, oil company executives, elected officials or
anyone else. The Energy Information Administration updated their 2004
report on the ANWR 10-02 area in May, 2008 (graph left). Their
Analysis of Crude Oil Production in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge is abundantly clear on what we can expect from ANWR.
The era of easy, cheap oil has come and gone. You don't have to take
my word for it, just read what the EIA says about the timing of
production at ANWR. I will only quote the highlights. Look at page 3
of the EIA's report for the whole story. This section gets a bit
technical. Sorry about that.
This analysis assumes that enactment of the legislation in 2008
would result in first production from the ANWR area in 10 years, i.e.,
2018. The primary constraints to a rapid development of ANWR oil
resources are the limited weather "windows" for collecting seismic
data and drilling wells (a 3-to-4 month winter window) and for ocean
barging of heavy infrastructure equipment to the well site (a 2-to-3
month summer window).
The assumption that ANWR oil production would begin 10 years after
legislation approves the Federal oil and natural gas leasing in the
1002 Area is based on the following 8-to-12 year timeline:
o 2 to 3 years to obtain leases, including the development of
a U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) leasing program, which includes
approval of an Environmental Impact Statement, the collection and
analysis of seismic data, and the auction and award of leases.
o 2 to 3 years to drill a single exploratory well. Exploratory
wells are slower to drill because geophysical data are collected
during drilling, e.g., rock cores and well logs. Typically, Alaska
North Slope exploration wells take two full winter seasons to reach
the desired depth...
o 3 to 4 years to construct the feeder pipelines; to fabricate
oil separation and treatment plants, and transport them up from the
lower-48 States to the North Slope by ocean barge; construct drilling
pads; drill to depth; and complete the wells...
[And so on]
Anwr_future_productionIn the mean resource case, ANWR production would
commence in 2018 if all of these steps happened without delay.
Supposed production would ramp up slowly, culminating in a peak of
780,000 barrels per day in 2027. Production would then decline to
710,000 barrels per day by 2030 (happy graph left).
As with Jack in the Gulf, the timing of this vision provides no help
in an oil crisis that gets worse by the day. And this is the EIA
making these predictions. The glass is never half empty for Department
of Energy analysts.
What is the mean resource case? You need to know because this is the
sticky point where the public gets mixed up. The EIA explains what the
mean resource case, which is based on a 1998 USGS study, actually
means.
In the mean [probability] oil resource case, the total volume of
technically recoverable crude oil projected to be found within the
coastal plain area is 10.4 billion barrels, compared to 5.7 billion
barrels for the 95-percent probability estimate, and 16.0 billion
barrels for the 5-percent probability estimate. Because the USGS 5-
percent and 95-percent probability oil resource estimates are
asymmetric around the mean estimate, the expected field size
distribution and, in turn, the distribution of projected oil
production are also asymmetric with respect to the mean estimate's
field sizes and projected production...
The mean probability estimate refers to a 1-in-2 chance of there
being oil resources at least equal to the size of that estimate; the
95-percent probability estimate refers to a 19-in-20 chance of there
being oil resources at least equal to the size of that estimate; and
the 5-percent probability estimate refers to a 1-in-20 chance of there
being oil resources at least equal to the size of that estimate.
The bottom line for ANWR, as for all the other unexplored protected
areas in the U.S, is that we are talking about probabilities of how
much recoverable oil will actually be discovered. The USGS presumes
that there is a 95% probability of finding 5.7 billion recoverable
barrels, and a 1 in 2 chance of finding 10.4 billion barrels. Other
assumptions must be made as well. The mean resource case of 10.4
billion barrels is the supposed volume of oil that will ultimately be
recovered. How much of this imaginary oil does the USGS guess will be
produced by 2030?
The 1998 USGS ANWR assessment assumed an average recovery factor
of 37 percent of the original-oil-in-place. This recovery factor is
based on primary (pressure-driven) and secondary (water-injection)
recovery techniques, but does not included tertiary (enhanced oil
recovery) techniques, which can increase oil recovery by an additional
5 to 15 percentage points...
Between 2018 and 2030, cumulative additional oil production is 2.6
billion barrels for the mean oil resource case...
Using the Geological Survey's 37% recovery factor, the supposed
original-oil-in-place is on the order of 28 billion barrels (10.4 / .
37). The EIA's 2.6 billion barrels is only 25% of the 10.4 billion
barrels that we may ultimately lift out of the ground, so the EIA has
further assumed that most of this hypothetical oil will be produced in
the years after 2030. ANWR is thus the gift that keeps on giving in
the far-off future. All of this not-yet-discovered oil comes too late
to change the fate of the current generation of Americans.
Evaluating ANWR is a crapshoot1 until you've drilled some test wells
and assessed the oil flows, for "there is little direct knowledge
regarding the petroleum geology of the ANWR region." That's why a
significant part of the delay in developing ANWR comes from drilling
these appraisal wells, as the EIA acknowledges.
It's still possible to drill a dry hole in the age of advanced 3-D
seismic subsurface imaging, or drill a well which doesn't produce oil
flows that justify commercial development. (Failed tests have occurred
several times in the Gulf of Mexico.) One reason people got
inordinately excited about Jack is that the #2 test well did indeed
indicate commercial oil flows.
Press accounts, even fairly good ones like Arctic Drilling Wouldn't
Cool High Oil Prices, assume that the 10.4 billion barrels is "the
most likely scenario," parroting the EIA's production flows for the
mean resource case (US News & World Report, May 23, 2008). I have
described this kind of behavior before, where the media "treats a
(probabilistic, geological) abstraction as if it had concrete or
material existence." This is the definition of the verb to reify.
I could make similar remarks for other areas of Alaska, e.g. the
Beaufort Sea, the NPR-A north slope area to the west of Prudhoe Bay,
or the Chukchi Sea, where MMS leasing round #193 recently took place.
At least Shell put their money where their mouth is, paying over
$105.3 million for a single exploration block offshore. The MMS
believes "there is up to 15 billion barrels of recoverable oil
reserves ... beneath the Chukchi Sea." Now you know how to evaluate
this statement--see ANWR above.
The Best Answers are on the Demand-Side
In the future we're going to throw every supply-side solution (wind,
solar, etc. assuming mostly electric cars) we've got at the energy
scarcity problem, but the oil situation is special. Oil is so precious
that we owe it to future generations to save some for their use. ANWR
is a good case in point. We could start the development now and get
some oil in the 2020s, or we can wait a little longer and see oil
flows (of unknown volumes) some years later. I suspect our elected
leaders will succumb to pressure within a few years and authorize
development of the resource, but it will do nothing to alleviate our
predicament in the next 15 years.
Americans have run through all their easily obtainable, cheap oil.
Therefore, the best solutions are on the demand-side. We must consume
less oil, that's all there is to it. Telecommuting, 4-day workweeks,
car pooling, new mass transit systems, long-haul railroads to replace
the airlines, you name it. All of this is a no-brainer. ANWR is not
the answer.
Don Tiberone wrote:
> http://www.energybulletin.net/45331.html
>
> ANWR is not the answer
>
> by Dave Cohen
Great article! Very informative.
Thanks for posting.
--
Good Earth Original Herbal Tea contains *Artificial Flavoring*
Don Tiberone <s...@m...com> wrote in
news:8918e1d4-6986-4579-acd0-9a0496aef292@y22g2000pr
d.googlegroups.com:
> http://www.energybulletin.net/45331.html
>
> ANWR is not the answer
>
> by Dave Cohen
>
> Surely some revelation is at hand;
> Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
> The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
> When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
> Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert...
>
> And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
> Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
> — from The Second Coming, W. B. Yeats
>
> Americans are easily misled about domestic "supply-side" solutions to
> rising oil prices and dwindling global exports. Their confusion is
> understandable. Oil company executives like Shell's John Hofmeister
> have called for opening up now restricted areas in Alaska or on the
> outer continental shelves, implying that salvation is only a few oil
> wells away.
>
> The United States Geological Survey (USGS) or the Mineral Management
> Service (MMS) routinely assign huge reserves numbers to unexploited,
> presumably prospective, areas, but it is not clear to people who do
> not follow the oil industry that these agencies are talking about
> undiscovered oil.
>
> The age of easy, cheap oil in the United States is over and done with
> (ASPO-USA, May 26, 2008). The Lower-48 peaked in 1970. The volatile
> shallow-water oil production in the Gulf of Mexico last peaked in
> 1998, forcing operators to move out to deeper and deeper water. The
> impressive development of Alaska's Prudhoe Bay in the 1970s will not
> be repeated elsewhere in Alaska onshore or off. Prudhoe Bay peaked in
> about 1989.
>
> An Exemplary Story
>
> Promoting supply-side solutions to America's oil crisis creates a
> dangerous delusion. Before turning to the Arctic National Wildlife
> Refuge (ANWR), I want to tell you an exemplary story because both time
> and memories are short. This article runs long as a result, but it's a
> good story.
>
> I have marked up the NYMEX monthly oil price curve I used in The Age
> of Aquarius, where I explained the market fundamentals driving the oil
> price (ASPO-USA, May 14, 2008). Here is the new version.
>
>
>
> The oil price took a downward turn in August, 2006. As you can see,
> the price had been volatile but rising from mid-2004 on. The August
> downturn could have been yet another price blip, but on September 5th,
> Chevron announced the successful Jack-#2 test well in the Walker Ridge
> area of the ultra-deepwater Gulf of Mexico. To a world starved for
> good news on the oil front, the Jack discovery was treated like the
> Second Coming.
>
> The_yukon I was writing for The Oil Drum (TOD) back then, and I duly
> penned (after consulting with oil industry insider "Bubba") Jack-2 and
> the Lower Tertiary of the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico on September 11th.
> I did not think Jack would have a significant impact on domestic
> supply in 2006 and I have not changed my mind in 2008.
>
>
> The media repeated the tentative claim of Chevron's geologists that
> there could be anywhere between 3 and 15 billion recoverable barrels
> in the Gulf lower tertiary play, emphasizing the high end of this
> exceptionally broad range. An energy illiterate public thought that
> sounded like a lot of oil. We could all continue to cruise to Wal-Mart
> in our GMC Yukons to buy cheap stuff made in China, no problemo.
>
> The hype surrounding the Jack flow test was like a tsunami washing
> over peak oil people stranded on beaches all over the world. Business
> Week said there was plenty of oil, just drill deeper. Cambridge Energy
> Research Associates (CERA) played up the discovery, which was no
> surprise, asking whether this might be the biggest oil play in 38
> years. Little did I know that CERA had some other tricks up their
> sleeve.
>
> Daniel_yergin The dip in the oil price which had started in August
> became a nosedive as the Autumn progressed and the Jack discovery
> guided market sentiment on oil. CERA moved in for the kill, releasing
> their report Why the "Peak Oil" Theory Falls Down — Myths, Legends
> and the Future of Oil Resources on November 10, 2006. This was just
> what the world wanted to hear—these "peak oil" people are a bunch of
> nutters, we're all whackos. Soon we would be swimming in new oil, Adam
> Smith's free market having worked its magic once again. Daniel Yergin
> had a field day in the fall of 2006. CERA report sales were no doubt
> brisk.
>
> Picking myself off the floor, and after consulting with Professor
> Goose and other Oil Drum editors, I sat down in a single marathon
> writing session to produce Does the Peak Oil "Myth" Just Fall Down?
> — Our Response to CERA, which was published at TOD on November 16,
> 2006. But the damage had been done. Take another look at the annotated
> price graph above.
>
> The downward price momentum spurred on by the Jack discovery and the
> CERA report finally bottomed out in January, 2007 when the average
> monthly NYMEX price fell to $54.57/barrel. I have added a rough curve
> fit (dotted line) to the graph which shows that if the price had
> continued to rise on the trend since mid-2004, the oil price would be
> just about where it is today, about $124/barrel. The market fooled
> itself into thinking happy days were here again. Precious time
> required to address the oil crisis was wasted. Oil became, for a time,
> underpriced. Now, you can't even trade in the Yukon (Wall Street
> Journal, June 2, 2008).
>
> And what of Jack? Chevron plans to drill another appraisal well
> sometime later this year. Commercial oil production is on hold pending
> the results and a development plan must be put together because the
> Walker Ridge is way out there in the Gulf many miles from
> nowhere—just like ANWR. And if BP's delayed Thunder Horse is any
> guide, don't get your hopes up for any oil from Jack (together with
> St. Malo) before 2014.
>
> And what of CERA? Now they say oil has as reached a turning point—
>
> What is now unfolding is an oil shock. The fact that the world
> could take $80 in its stride in the context of strong economic growth
> does not mean that a price that is 60 per cent higher at a time of a
> credit crunch will be so easily assimilated. The economic toll is
> mounting. Airlines are certainly in shock as they start charging for
> checked luggage to find a way to pass on their biggest cost. Carmakers
> are reeling. Retailers are tracking the shrinking wallets of their
> customers. The rising prices for food reflect, in part, the impact of
> higher energy costs.
>
> My goodness, it's an oil shock! ἐδάκρυσεν ὁ
> ἰησοῦς—Jesus Wept (John's Gospel, 11:35).
>
> The Jack story serves as a cautionary tale for those who believe
> supply-side solutions to America's oil supply problem are a magic
> bullet that will end our energy suffering. Let's turn now to ANWR to
> see what the future might hold for supply-side solutions there should
> the area be opened up for development.
>
> ANWR Is Not The Answer
>
> Anwr_north_slope Realistic expectations about ANWR needn't come as any
> surprise to the media, oil company executives, elected officials or
> anyone else. The Energy Information Administration updated their 2004
> report on the ANWR 10-02 area in May, 2008 (graph left). Their
> Analysis of Crude Oil Production in the Arctic National Wildlife
> Refuge is abundantly clear on what we can expect from ANWR.
>
> The era of easy, cheap oil has come and gone. You don't have to take
> my word for it, just read what the EIA says about the timing of
> production at ANWR. I will only quote the highlights. Look at page 3
> of the EIA's report for the whole story. This section gets a bit
> technical. Sorry about that.
>
> This analysis assumes that enactment of the legislation in 2008
> would result in first production from the ANWR area in 10 years, i.e.,
> 2018. The primary constraints to a rapid development of ANWR oil
> resources are the limited weather ‶windows” for collecting seismic
> data and drilling wells (a 3-to-4 month winter window) and for ocean
> barging of heavy infrastructure equipment to the well site (a 2-to-3
> month summer window).
>
> The assumption that ANWR oil production would begin 10 years after
> legislation approves the Federal oil and natural gas leasing in the
> 1002 Area is based on the following 8-to-12 year timeline:
>
> • 2 to 3 years to obtain leases, including the development
> of
> a U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) leasing program, which includes
> approval of an Environmental Impact Statement, the collection and
> analysis of seismic data, and the auction and award of leases.
> • 2 to 3 years to drill a single exploratory well.
> Exploratory
> wells are slower to drill because geophysical data are collected
> during drilling, e.g., rock cores and well logs. Typically, Alaska
> North Slope exploration wells take two full winter seasons to reach
> the desired depth...
> • 3 to 4 years to construct the feeder pipelines; to
> fabricate
> oil separation and treatment plants, and transport them up from the
> lower-48 States to the North Slope by ocean barge; construct drilling
> pads; drill to depth; and complete the wells...
>
> [And so on]
>
> Anwr_future_productionIn the mean resource case, ANWR production would
> commence in 2018 if all of these steps happened without delay.
> Supposed production would ramp up slowly, culminating in a peak of
> 780,000 barrels per day in 2027. Production would then decline to
> 710,000 barrels per day by 2030 (happy graph left).
>
> As with Jack in the Gulf, the timing of this vision provides no help
> in an oil crisis that gets worse by the day. And this is the EIA
> making these predictions. The glass is never half empty for Department
> of Energy analysts.
>
> What is the mean resource case? You need to know because this is the
> sticky point where the public gets mixed up. The EIA explains what the
> mean resource case, which is based on a 1998 USGS study, actually
> means.
>
> In the mean [probability] oil resource case, the total volume of
> technically recoverable crude oil projected to be found within the
> coastal plain area is 10.4 billion barrels, compared to 5.7 billion
> barrels for the 95-percent probability estimate, and 16.0 billion
> barrels for the 5-percent probability estimate. Because the USGS 5-
> percent and 95-percent probability oil resource estimates are
> asymmetric around the mean estimate, the expected field size
> distribution and, in turn, the distribution of projected oil
> production are also asymmetric with respect to the mean estimate’s
> field sizes and projected production...
>
> The mean probability estimate refers to a 1-in-2 chance of there
> being oil resources at least equal to the size of that estimate; the
> 95-percent probability estimate refers to a 19-in-20 chance of there
> being oil resources at least equal to the size of that estimate; and
> the 5-percent probability estimate refers to a 1-in-20 chance of there
> being oil resources at least equal to the size of that estimate.
>
> The bottom line for ANWR, as for all the other unexplored protected
> areas in the U.S, is that we are talking about probabilities of how
> much recoverable oil will actually be discovered. The USGS presumes
> that there is a 95% probability of finding 5.7 billion recoverable
> barrels, and a 1 in 2 chance of finding 10.4 billion barrels. Other
> assumptions must be made as well. The mean resource case of 10.4
> billion barrels is the supposed volume of oil that will ultimately be
> recovered. How much of this imaginary oil does the USGS guess will be
> produced by 2030?
>
> The 1998 USGS ANWR assessment assumed an average recovery factor
> of 37 percent of the original-oil-in-place. This recovery factor is
> based on primary (pressure-driven) and secondary (water-injection)
> recovery techniques, but does not included tertiary (enhanced oil
> recovery) techniques, which can increase oil recovery by an additional
> 5 to 15 percentage points...
>
> Between 2018 and 2030, cumulative additional oil production is 2.6
> billion barrels for the mean oil resource case...
>
> Using the Geological Survey's 37% recovery factor, the supposed
> original-oil-in-place is on the order of 28 billion barrels (10.4 / .
> 37). The EIA's 2.6 billion barrels is only 25% of the 10.4 billion
> barrels that we may ultimately lift out of the ground, so the EIA has
> further assumed that most of this hypothetical oil will be produced in
> the years after 2030. ANWR is thus the gift that keeps on giving in
> the far-off future. All of this not-yet-discovered oil comes too late
> to change the fate of the current generation of Americans.
>
> Evaluating ANWR is a crapshoot1 until you've drilled some test wells
> and assessed the oil flows, for "there is little direct knowledge
> regarding the petroleum geology of the ANWR region." That's why a
> significant part of the delay in developing ANWR comes from drilling
> these appraisal wells, as the EIA acknowledges.
>
> It's still possible to drill a dry hole in the age of advanced 3-D
> seismic subsurface imaging, or drill a well which doesn't produce oil
> flows that justify commercial development. (Failed tests have occurred
> several times in the Gulf of Mexico.) One reason people got
> inordinately excited about Jack is that the #2 test well did indeed
> indicate commercial oil flows.
>
> Press accounts, even fairly good ones like Arctic Drilling Wouldn't
> Cool High Oil Prices, assume that the 10.4 billion barrels is "the
> most likely scenario," parroting the EIA's production flows for the
> mean resource case (US News & World Report, May 23, 2008). I have
> described this kind of behavior before, where the media "treats a
> (probabilistic, geological) abstraction as if it had concrete or
> material existence." This is the definition of the verb to reify.
>
> I could make similar remarks for other areas of Alaska, e.g. the
> Beaufort Sea, the NPR-A north slope area to the west of Prudhoe Bay,
> or the Chukchi Sea, where MMS leasing round #193 recently took place.
> At least Shell put their money where their mouth is, paying over
> $105.3 million for a single exploration block offshore. The MMS
> believes "there is up to 15 billion barrels of recoverable oil
> reserves ... beneath the Chukchi Sea." Now you know how to evaluate
> this statement—see ANWR above.
>
>
> The Best Answers are on the Demand-Side
>
> In the future we're going to throw every supply-side solution (wind,
> solar, etc. assuming mostly electric cars) we've got at the energy
> scarcity problem, but the oil situation is special. Oil is so precious
> that we owe it to future generations to save some for their use. ANWR
> is a good case in point. We could start the development now and get
> some oil in the 2020s, or we can wait a little longer and see oil
> flows (of unknown volumes) some years later. I suspect our elected
> leaders will succumb to pressure within a few years and authorize
> development of the resource, but it will do nothing to alleviate our
> predicament in the next 15 years.
>
> Americans have run through all their easily obtainable, cheap oil.
> Therefore, the best solutions are on the demand-side. We must consume
> less oil, that's all there is to it. Telecommuting, 4-day workweeks,
> car pooling, new mass transit systems, long-haul railroads to replace
> the airlines, you name it. All of this is a no-brainer. ANWR is not
> the answer.
Thank you. Very informative. Unfortunately, people in this group, like
Babs, will never read it, nor understand it if they did.
there is no oil supply problem. supply exceds demand.
all "pump and dump" bullshit talk
"Arrest the oil commodity speculators for conspiracy to commit "price
fixing" !
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Comics has now converted to 'Cat-lick' since. . .
Why is Oil Up? Why Is It Headed to $325 and how has America Caved in to the Saudis????
"THE SPECULATORS WHO CRIED WOLF"
The more I look at the financial markets...
When will Americans learn to communicate to their government like the South Koreans?
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